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The Supreme Court of Canada's unanimous
decision in Charkaoui v. Canada' has attracted
much public attention. Perhaps most newswor-
thy is the fact that these cases -challenges by
three men to provisions of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)2 under which they
were detained - represent the first time since
September 11, 2001 that the Supreme Court has
delivered a defeat to the government in its anti-
terrorism efforts.
Until Charkaoui, the Court had shown
much deference toward the government in this
sensitive area. For example, in Suresh v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),3 the
Court left open the possibility that at least in
"extraordinary circumstances" it might be per-
missible for the government to deport a non-
resident to a country where she faces a substan-
tial likelihood of torture. Even more important
in that case was the Court's endorsement of a
deferential approach for reviewing the Minister
of Immigration's determination about the like-
lihood of torture on deportation. Through this
move the Court abdicated much responsibility
for protecting individual rights to the execu-
tive.
Less significant, but still noteworthy, was the
Court's decision in Application under s. 83.28
of the Criminal Code (Re),4 upholding the con-
troversial anti-terrorism investigative hearings
that were hastily added to Canadian law as part
the Anti-Terrorism Act.' That legislation was
introduced in the fall of 2001, while the Twin
Towers were still smouldering.
To many observers, these cases seemed to
signal that everything may have indeed changed
since 9/11, even in Canada. As in other western
democracies, our commitment to longstand-
ing human rights principles suddenly seemed
vulnerable when suspected terrorists were the
targets.
In Charkaoui, however, the government's
honeymoon before the Supreme Court in anti-
terrorism cases came to an end. For those who
followed these cases as they made their way to
the Court, the result is not entirely surprising.
At the hearing, the judges aggressively chal-
lenged government lawyers on the fairness of
holding individuals for potentially indefinite
periods without providing the detainee, or a
lawyer acting on his or her behalf, with an op-
portunity to review and respond to the actual
evidence. It is not surprising, then, that Chief
Justice McLachlin's reasons for the Court in
Charkaoui recognized the fundamental unfair-
ness of denying people their liberty without af-
fording them a chance to know the case against
them, or to respond to that case.
A legislative response from the government,
within the one-year grace period granted by the
Court, will undoubtedly follow. The most likely
solution will be a regime like that in the United
Kingdom, where a small group of lawyers with
security clearance are charged with the respon-
sibility of responding to the confidential aspects
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of the government's allegations. Any portion of
the proceedings that might reveal state secrets
will take place in camera, with the targeted in-
dividual excluded from the courtroom while
the lawyer with security clearance challenges
the secret evidence on that person's behalf. Such
a scheme would seem to be the minimum de-
manded by the Charkaoui judgment, in which
the Court referred to the English approach with
approval.
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The Section 7 Story
Equally important, but not reported in the
popular press, is the significance of Charkaoui
to the Supreme Court's section 7 Charter of
Rights and Freedoms7 procedural fairness juris-
prudence.
In truth, had the Court wanted to turn
a blind eye to the unfairness inherent in the
current security certificate system, its existing
section 7 precedents gave it much flexibility in
choosing a more deferential path. I will mo-
mentarily explain the topography of the road
not traveled, but for now a more detailed con-
sideration of the Court's analysis is warranted.
In Charkaoui the Court restated many of
the key principles that have emerged from its
prior section 7 procedural fairness cases. For
example, the Court reminded us that what is
constitutionally required from a procedural
standpoint may vary from one context to an-
other, depending on the individual and state
interests that are implicated."
The Court also pointed out something that
has too often been forgotten by some western
democracies in the post-9/11 world. Simply be-
cause the state's interest happens to be national
security does not mean that long established
principles of fair process should automatically
be suspended:
[Wihile administrative constraints associated
with the context of national security may in-
form the analysis on whether a particular pro-
cess is fundamentally unfair, security concerns
cannot be used to excuse procedures that do
not conform to fundamental justice at the s.
7 stage of the analysis. If the context makes it
impossible to adhere to the principles of fun-
damental justice in their usual form, adequate
substitutes may be found. But the principles
must be respected to pass the hurdle of s. 7.
That is the bottom line.9
The difficulty with the procedure contem-
plated by the challenged provisions in the IRPA
is that they fail to meet what the Court identi-
fies, for the first time, as the minimum constitu-
tional requirements for fair process:
[Ilt comprises the right to a hearing. It requires
that the hearing be before an independent and
impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by
the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it
entails the right to know the case put against
one, and the right to answer that case. Precise-
ly how these requirements are met will vary
with the context. But for s. 7 to be satisfied,
each of them must be met in substance.10
Here, the regime fell down because it did
not respect the final two requirements: the right
to know the case one is facing and the right
to answer that case. Nor did it provide an ad-
equate substitute for those rights, for example
by employing a system like that in the United
Kingdom, as mentioned above.
This was so, even though the IRPA requires
the reviewing judge to provide the affected indi-
vidual with a summary of the information fur-
nished by the government so as to enable him
to be reasonably informed of the circumstances
giving rise to the certificate. The person could
then use that summary to argue that the secu-
rity certificate should not have been issued. The
summary, however, cannot include anything
that would, in the opinion of the judge, be in-
jurious to national security or to the safety of
any person.
For the Court, the summary, and the chance
to respond to it, were not enough to comply
with section 7. The difficulty with this, said the
Court, was that:
[i]t could mean that the judge may be required
to decide the case, wholly or in part, on the
basis of information that the named person
and his or her counsel never see. The person
may know nothing of the case to meet, and al-
though technically afforded an opportunity to
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be heard, may be left in a position of having no
idea as to what needs to be said."
Given its conclusion that the scheme is in-
herently unfair and therefore fundamentally
unjust, the Court had little difficulty conclud-
ing that the resulting constitutional violation
could not be reasonably justified in a free and
democratic society.
The Court's analysis seems clear and com-
pelling. The main difficulty with its approach
is that it is hard to reconcile with its own pri-
or judgments. Before Charkaoui, the Supreme
Court had consistently rejected the idea that fair
process necessitated full access to all relevant
information and an opportunity to address the
decision-maker on the merits. 2
For example, just last year in R. v. Rodgers,3
the Court rejected a section 7 challenge to sec-
tion 487.055 of the Criminal Code. That provi-
sion allows for the issuance of a court order, on
ex parte bases, for the collection of DNA sam-
ples from already convicted and incarcerated
offenders. In other words, the Court upheld a
scheme whereby an individual's DNA could be
taken without prior notice or an opportunity to
address the judge who is asked to issue the order.
This procedure was upheld, even though there
was no compelling state interest necessitating
an ex parte process. Remember, in that con-
text, those affected are already in custody and
therefore unable to flee the jurisdiction if given
notice and a chance to be heard. In addition, the
DNA of these offenders was not something that
could be destroyed or concealed, such that the
need for stealth on the part of the government
could be justified.
Even more significantly, in Chiarelli v. Cana-
da (Minister of Employment and Immigration),1
4
the Supreme Court upheld the impugned pro-
visions. Chiarelli was a case involving a landed
immigrant who was subject to an immigration
removal certificate for alleged connections to
organized crime under a legislative scheme that
was strikingly similar to that at issue in Charka-
oui. It did so, even though at the time, the leg-
islation required only that a summary of the
evidence relied on be disclosed to the individual
whose deportation was being sought.
The challenge in Charkaoui was how to dis-
tinguish these prior judgments. The Court did
so by emphasizing the stakes involved in this
case:
Where limited disclosure or ex parte hearings
have been found to satisfy the principles of
fundamental justice, the intrusion on liberty
and security has typically been less serious
than that effected by the IRPA .... It is one
thing to deprive a person of full information
where fingerprinting is at stake, and quite an-
other to deny him or her information where
the consequences are removal from the coun-
try or indefinite detention. Moreover, even in
the less intrusive situations, courts have insist-
ed that disclosure be as specific and complete
as possible.'"
Of course, conspicuously absent from this
paragraph is any attempt by the Court to dis-
tinguish the circumstances in Chiarelli from
those in Charkaoui. This is not entirely surpris-
ing. The cases are difficult to distinguish, re-
membering that both involved the permanent
removal of individuals from Canada.
Also refreshingly absent from Charkaoui,
no doubt because of the ultimate result, is the
rhetorical device that the Court has often of-
fered up whenever a procedural fairness claim
is denied - that the principles of fundamen-
tal justice require only fairness, not "the most
favourable procedures that could possibly be
imagined.'
6
What I hope is apparent by this point is that
there has been much imprecision in the Court's
prior section 7 jurisprudence regarding what
procedural fairness demands. As a result, it
would have been very easy for the Court to ra-
tionalize upholding the sections at issue in this
case.
That said, I do not mean to suggest that the
decision in Charkoui should not be celebrated.
It is profoundly unfair that someone could be
arrested, held in custody, and ultimately de-
ported based entirely on evidence that neither
they nor their legal representative is permitted
to see and consequently answer.
My complaint is much more general, ex-
tending well beyond the context of Canada's
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anti-terrorism efforts. In short, that the judg-
ment fails to provide much guidance on when
the implications for liberty or security of the
person will be sufficiently great that notice, full
disclosure (at least to the individual's legal rep-
resentative) and an opportunity to be heard will
be constitutionally mandated.
The standards for engaging liberty or secu-
rity of the person under section 7 are not low.
Only serious interferences with individual au-
tonomy qualify.17 Therefore, simply suggesting,
as the Court does in Charkaoui, that when the
stakes are great enough the demands of proce-
dural fairness increase, tells us very little.
By choosing the path it did, the Court care-
fully avoided acknowledging any limitation in
its prior section 7 decisions involving procedur-
al fairness claims. In the process, it missed an
important opportunity to offer a more coherent
account of how to go about measuring what due
process demands in any given context.
You may be wondering what I have in
mind.
An alternative approach
Ultimately, "how much due process?" is a
question that necessitates an analysis that be-
gins from the perspective of the individual
whose interests are affected. The concrete im-
pact on that individual's liberty or security
of the person must be considered against the
state's more abstract and competing interest(s).
In measuring how much due process to pro-
vide, the most sensible question is to ask is: how
much can the state reasonably afford? Here, I
do not mean simply monetary cost, although
that is undoubtedly a legitimate consideration.
Rather, what I have in mind are the potential
drawbacks for the interests of the state if more
due process is given.
Returning to the circumstances in Charka-
oui, the individual interests involved in this
case are significant. The issuance of a security
certificate leads to arrest, detention, and, ulti-
mately, deportation. Weighted on the other end
of the scale are the legitimate interests of the
state, which would seem to be twofold here: first,
streamlining security certificate procedures
so that individuals who do pose a threat to the
safety of Canada are removed from the coun-
try as quickly as possible; and, second, ensuring
that sensitive state secrets remain confidential.
Both state objectives are very important.
Once the competing interests are identified
and placed on the scale in this way the ques-
tion to be asked is this: if more due process is
provided, would the state's legitimate objectives
be undermined? If the answer to that question
is "no," as it is in Charkaoui, then the amount
of procedural fairness being provided should be
increased until the balancing point is reached.
Here, as the Court correctly concluded, the in-
terests of the state could be more than adequately
met through a system of security cleared coun-
sel who could have full access to the evidence
and could therefore meaningfully challenge the
government's case.
In other words, the existing regime is fun-
damentally unjust because it subordinates the
interests of the individual to those of the state
in circumstances where there is no apprecia-
ble benefit to state interests. Unfortunately, a
more coherent account of how to go about de-
termining how much due process section 7 of
the Charter demands will need to await some
future case.
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